It is well-known that a transferable utility game has a non-empty core if and only if it is balanced. In the class of non-transferable utility games balancedness or the more general pbalancedness due to Billera (SIAM J. Appl. Math. 18 (1970) 567) is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for the core to be non-empty. This paper gives a natural extension of the p-balancedness condition that is both necessary and sufficient for non-emptiness of the core. r
Introduction
A cooperative game with non-transferable utility is an assignment of a set of feasible utility allocations to each coalition of players. The core of a cooperative game selects those utility allocations that are robust to all possible deviations by coalitions.
In Bondareva [2] and in Shapley [8] the notion of a balanced game has been introduced for games with transferable utility (TU-games). It has been demonstrated that a TU-game has a non-empty core if and only if it is a balanced game. Scarf [7] has extended the condition of balancedness to games with non-transferable utility (NTU-games) and proved that every balanced NTU-game has a non-empty core.
Billera [1] has further generalized the notion of a balanced game. In his work the balancedness condition is defined with respect to a system p of coalitional vectors specifying the power or weight of each agent within every coalition. The existence of the system of the coalitional vectors p such that the game is p-balanced suffices for the core to be non-empty. Moreover, when attention is restricted to hyperplane games, a non-empty core implies p-balancedness for an appropriate choice of p: In general, the equivalence of p-balanced games and games with a nonempty core does not hold: an example of a game with a non-empty core that is not balanced for any choice of p is given in Billera [1] . Generalizations of Billera's balancedness conditions have been given for cooperative games in permutational structure (see [10] ) and cooperative games in graph structure (see [4] ). These conditions weaken p-balancedness and are sufficient for the core to be non-empty, although not necessary.
A natural generalization of the p-balancedness condition is achieved by allowing the system of coalitional vectors p to depend on the utility allocations. In this paper we define the balancedness of the game with respect to a correspondence P that assigns to each allocation of utilities a set of coalitional vectors p: We therefore allow the power of an agent within a coalition to depend on the utility allocation that is proposed. We prove that the core of an NTU-game is non-empty if it is balanced with respect to some correspondence P: Conversely, for a given game with a nonempty core we construct a correspondence P satisfying the condition of Pbalancedness. Thus, P-balancedness is not only a sufficient, but also a necessary condition for non-emptiness of the core.
To the best of our knowledge, the only alternative necessary and sufficient balancedness condition for non-emptiness of the core is given by Keiding and Thorlund-Petersen [6] . The advantage of our P-balancedness condition over the condition in Keiding and Thorlund-Petersen [6] is that it applies directly to the game of interest and avoids the construction of any auxiliary games or sequences of approximating games.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 some notation is introduced. In Section 3 we discuss the p-balancedness condition of Billera [1] and the ðp; oÞ-balancedness condition of Keiding and Thorlund-Petersen [6] . 2 In Section 4 the P-balancedness condition is defined and the main result of the paper is proved. In Section 5 we examine an example (due to Billera [1] ) of a game which has a non-empty core without being p-balanced for any system of coalitional vectors p:
Notation
Let n be a positive integer. Then N is the set of integers f1; y; ng; and N is the collection of non-empty subsets of the set N: R n is the space of functions x : iAN/x i AR: R N is the space of functions l : SAN/l S AR: Let D N denote the unit simplex in R n ;
: If x and y are elements of R n ; then x Á y denotes the scalar product of x and y; that is x Á y ¼ P iAN x i y i : For each SAN let 1 S be the vector in R n with component 1 i S equal to 1 if iAS and equal to 0 otherwise. For a subset A of R n ; the symbols int A and @A denote, respectively, the interior and the boundary of A:
p-Balancedness and ðp; oÞ-balancedness
An n-person game with non-transferable utility (hereafter referred to simply as a game) is a family of sets V ¼ /V ðSÞS SAN satisfying the following assumptions:
ðG1Þ For all SAN; V ðSÞ is a non-empty proper closed subset of R n : ðG2Þ For all SAN; ½xAV ðSÞ; yAR n ; y i px i for all iAS implies ½yAV ðSÞ: ðG3Þ The set V ðNÞ\ S iAN int V ðfigÞ is non-empty and compact. A vector xAR n is an element of the core of the game V if xAV ðNÞ and there exist no SAN and no yAV ðSÞ such that x i oy i for all iAS: The core of the game V is denoted by CðV Þ: Therefore,
Below we reproduce the p-balancedness condition of Billera [1] . Let an element p of the set D be given. A collection of coalitions bDN is said to be p-balanced if there exists lAD N such that
A game V is said to be p-balanced if for every p-balanced collection of coalitions bDN it holds that \ SAb V ðSÞDV ðNÞ:
If there exists some pAD such that the game V is p-balanced, then the core of V is non-empty. The p-balancedness condition has been generalized in the work of Keiding and Thorlund-Petersen [6] . Given a game V and a coalition SAN let V p ðSÞ ¼ fx S AR S þ j xAV ðSÞg; where R S þ is the set of non-negative functions with domain S; and x S is the restriction of the function xAR n to the set S: 1 Let R denote the set of binary relations o on the set N satisfying the following conditions: * o is acyclic: If S j AN for all jAf1; y; kg and S 1 oS 2 o?oS k ; then we cannot have S k oS 1 : * All one player coalitions are minimal: For all iAN there is no SAN such that Sofig:
Let pAD and oAR be given. A game V is said to be ðp; oÞ-balanced if the following condition is satisfied: If bDN is a p-balanced collection of coalitions and
then xAV ðNÞ: The game V is said to be weakly ðp; oÞ-balanced if there exists a sequence fV t g N t¼1 of ðp; oÞ-balanced games such that * V ðNÞ ¼ V t ðNÞ for all t; and * for every SAN the sequence fV t p ðSÞg N t¼1 converges to the set V p ðSÞ in the topology induced by the Hausdorff metric on the set of non-empty compact subsets of R n :
Theorem 1 below gives a characterization of NTU-games with a non-empty core.
Theorem 1 (Keiding and Thorlund-Petersen [6] ). Let V be a game. Then the core of V is non-empty if and only if there exist pAD; oAR; and a weakly ðp; oÞ-balanced game V 0 such that V ðNÞ ¼ V 0 ðNÞ and V ðSÞDV 0 ðSÞ for all SAN:
The purpose of the next section is to give a necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core that applies directly to the game of interest V : In particular, our condition of P-balancedness avoids the construction of an auxiliary game like V 0 and does not use the approximation of the game V 0 by a sequence of games fV t g N t¼1 :
P-Balancedness
As a preliminary result we state the P-balanced version of the weak Knaster, Kuratowski, Mazurkiewicz, and Shapley (K-K-M-S) theorem. The original version of the K-K-M-S theorem can be found in Shapley [9] . Theorem 2 can be easily established using the fixed point theorem of Kakutani (analogous to the proof of the K-K-M-S theorem in Herings [3] ).
Theorem 2 (P-balanced weak K-K-M-S). Let fC S DD N j SANg be a closed cover of D N such that if S and T are elements of N and the set D T -C S is non-empty, then SDT: Let P : D N -D be a convex-valued correspondence with a closed graph. Then there exist x Ã AD N ; p Ã APðx Ã Þ; and l Ã AD N such that
Definition 1. Let a game V and a convex-valued correspondence P : R n -D with a closed graph be given. The game V is said to be P-balanced provided that the following condition is satisfied: If xAR n ; pAPðxÞ; and lAD N are such that xA \ SAN:l S 40 V ðSÞ;
then xAV ðNÞ:
The p-balancedness condition of Billera [1] is defined relative to a fixed element p of the set D: It corresponds to the special case of Definition 1 where P is singlevalued and independent of the utility allocation. By using the concept of Pbalancedness, we allow the power of an agent within a coalition to depend on the utility allocation that is proposed.
Theorem 3. Let V be a game. Suppose that there exists a convex-valued correspondence P : R n -D with a closed graph such that the game V is P-balanced. Then the core of the game V is non-empty.
We do not report the proof of Theorem 3. Our argument essentially replicates the proof of the Scarf's theorem given in Kannai [5] . The key role in the proof of Theorem 3 is played by the P-balanced weak K-K-M-S theorem.
Theorem 4 below asserts that P-balancedness is not only a sufficient, but also a necessary condition for the non-emptiness of the core.
Theorem 4. Let V be a game with a non-empty core. Then there exists a convexvalued correspondence P : R n -D with a closed graph such that the game V is Pbalanced.
Proof. We make use of the following lemma. Define the continuous mapping g S : R n -@V ðSÞ by g S ðxÞ ¼ x À t S ðxÞ1 S for all xAR n : Let x Ã be an element of the core of the game V : Define the correspondence P : R n -D by letting the set PðxÞ be the product of the sets P S ðxÞ; where
for all SAN and xAR n :
To see that the set P S ðxÞ is non-empty, observe that it is given by the intersection of the sets P À S ðxÞ and P þ S ðxÞ; where
If the set P À S ðxÞ were empty for some xAR n ; then the inequality p S Á g S ðx Ã Þ4p S Á g S ðxÞ would be satisfied for all p S AD S : In particular, this inequality would hold for all vertices of the simplex D S ; implying that g i S ðx Ã Þ4g i S ðxÞ for all iAS: As g S ðx Ã ÞA@V ðSÞ; this would imply g S ðxÞAint V ðSÞ; contradicting the definition of g S : A similar argument shows that the set P þ S ðxÞ is non-empty. Moreover, both sets P À S ðxÞ and P þ S ðxÞ are closed, and P À S ðxÞ,P þ S ðxÞ ¼ D S : Connectedness of the set D S implies that the intersection of P À S ðxÞ and P þ S ðxÞ is non-empty. Convexity of the sets P S ðxÞ is trivial. To prove that the graph of the correspondence P is closed, let ðx ðkÞ ; p ðkÞ Þ be a sequence of points in R n Â D satisfying p ðkÞ APðx ðkÞ Þ and converging to some point ðx ð0Þ ; p ð0Þ Þ: Then the equalities p SðkÞ Á g S ðx Ã Þ ¼ p SðkÞ Á g S ðx ðkÞ Þ; SAN hold for all members of the sequence. By continuity of the mappings g S ; it holds in the limit that p Sð0Þ Á g S ðx Ã Þ ¼ p Sð0Þ Á g S ðx ð0Þ Þ; SAN: Therefore, p ð0Þ APðx ð0Þ Þ:
Next we show that the game V is P-balanced. Let xAR n ; pAPðxÞ; and lAD N be such that xA \ SAN: l S 40 V ðSÞ;
By part (3) of Lemma 1, for all SAN with l S 40 it holds that t S ðxÞp0: As x Ã eint V ðSÞ; we have 0pt S ðx Ã Þ: It follows that for all SAN with l S 40 the following inequalities hold:
where the second to last equality is implied by the fact that x Ã ¼ g N ðx Ã Þ: By definition of g N ðxÞ; this gives the inequality t N ðxÞp0; and the inclusion xAV ðNÞ: & Theorems 3 and 4 show that P-balancedness is necessary and sufficient for nonemptiness of the core. The condition is relatively simple and provides a natural extension of p-balanced concept of Billera that closes the gap between necessary and sufficient conditions for non-emptiness of the core.
An example
In this section we examine the example from Billera [1] of a game which has a nonempty core without being p-balanced for any system of coalitional vectors p: We show that there is a natural choice of the correspondence P such that the game in question is P-balanced. In addition, we demonstrate that the game is not ðp; oÞbalanced for any p and any binary operation o; and construct an artificial game V 0 satisfying the condition of Theorem 1.
Let V be a game with three players where V ðf1; 2; 3gÞ ¼ fxAR 3 j x 1 p1; x 2 p1; x 3 p0g;
V ðSÞ ¼ fxAR 3 j x i p0 for all iASg for any SaN; f1; 2g:
The game V has a unique core-element, ð1; 1; 0Þ:
We show that there is no pAD such that V is a p-balanced game. Suppose first that the vector p N has at least one zero component. Then the collection of singletons b ¼ ffig j p i N 40g is a p-balanced collection of coalitions, whereas the intersection T SAb V ðSÞ is not a subset of V ðNÞ: Suppose that all components of the vector p are positive. We can then assume without loss of generality that p i N ¼ 1 n for all iAN: Now, if p 1 f1;2g ¼ p 2 f1;2g then the collection of coalitions a ¼ ff1; 2g; f3gg is p-balanced. Since the vector ð2; 0; 0Þ is an element of V ðf1; 2gÞ and V ðf3gÞ but not of V ðf1; 2; 3gÞ; the condition of p-balancedness is violated. In case p 1 f1;2g 4p 2 f1;2g the collection b ¼ ff1; 2g; f2g; f3gg is p-balanced, with ð2; 0; 0Þ being feasible for each S in b: Finally, if p 1 f1;2g op 2 f1;2g then the collection of coalitions g ¼ ff1; 2g; f1g; f3gg is p-balanced. In this case the vector ð0; 2; 0Þ violates the p-balancedness condition.
Having these considerations in mind it is straightforward to construct a correspondence P such that the game V is P-balanced. In particular, there should be no p in Pð2; 0; 0Þ such that either a or b is a p-balanced collection of coalitions. There also should be no pAPð0; 2; 0Þ such that the collection g is balanced relative to p: We let
where the numbers a and b satisfy a4bX0 and a þ b ¼ 1: For any coalition Saf1; 2g we let P S ðxÞ equal the barycenter of D S :
To see that V is balanced relative to P let xAR n ; pAPðxÞ; and lAD N be such that xA \ SAb V ðSÞ;
where b ¼ fSAN : l S 40g: If NAb there is nothing to prove. We therefore assume that Neb: Suppose also that the coalition f1; 2g is not a member of the collection b:
Since p 1 N 40; b must contain either the coalition f1g or the coalition f1; 3g; or both. In either case x 1 p0: Similar reasoning for x 2 and x 3 shows that none of them is positive. Hence, xAV ðNÞ:
Now consider the case where the coalition f1; 2g is a member of b: If x 1 ox 2 then, by construction of the correspondence P; p 1 f1;2g 4p 2 f1;2g : Therefore, the collection b must contain either coalition f2g or coalition f2; 3g; or both, so x 2 p0: Since p 3 N 40; there is at least one coalition in b which contains player 3; so that x 3 p0: Thus, x belongs to V ðNÞ: If x 2 ox 1 then p 2 f1;2g 4p 1 f1;2g implying that b contains either the singleton f1g or the coalition f1; 3g: In both cases, x 1 p0: As before, we have x 3 p0: Thus, xAV ðNÞ: Finally, if x 1 equals x 2 then both of them are less than or equal to 1, and therefore x belongs to V ðNÞ:
Turning to the condition of Keiding and Thorlund-Petersen, observe that the vectors ð2; 0; 0Þ and ð0; 2; 0Þ are not in the interior of any of the feasibility sets V ðSÞ of the game V : Hence, our argument that V is not a p-balanced game for any p is valid as a proof that it is not a ðp; oÞ-balanced game for any p and any oAR: Let V 0 be a game where If the coalition f1; 2g is not in b then one can argue as in the case with Pbalancedness that xAV 0 ðNÞ: If f1; 2g is a member of the collection b then x must lie outside the interior of V 0 ðfigÞ for all iAN; which implies that x 1 X1; x 2 X1; and x 3 X0: Thus, x ¼ ð1; 1; 0Þ; which belongs to V 0 ðNÞ:
